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Gordon Shotwell* Feeling Relational: The Use of Buddhist
Meditation in Restorative Practices
Some theorists have argued that restorative justice can be defined as a theory
of justice based on the. relationality of self-the idea that the self exists in and
through its relationships with others. This account of self, while analytically
compelling, conflicts with our intuitions of individuality I argue that Buddhist
metaphysics provides an explanation of this conflict, and that meditation practice
can help restorative justice practitioners develop an intuitive understanding of the
relationality of self.
Certains thdoriciens ont avanc6 que la justice r6paratrice peut 6tre d6finie comme
6tant une th6prie de la justice fondde sur la relationnalit6 du moi-l'id6e que le
moi existe par et dans ses rapports avec les autres. MCme si elle est attirante sur
le plan de l'analyse, cette idde du moi s'oppose I nos intuitions de l'individualitd.
L'auteur avance que la mdtaphysique bouddhiste donne une explication de ce
conflit et que la pratique de la mdditation peut aider les praticiens de la justice
rdparatrice & acqudrir une comprehension intuitive de la relationnalit6 du moi.
* Articling Student at Lenczner Slaght Royce Smith Griffin. The author would like to thank
Jennifer Llewellyn, Alexis Shotwell, and the NSRJ-CURA researchers, for their insightful comments
on previous drafts of this paper.
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Introduction
The inspiration for this paper comes from Rebecca Redwood French's The
Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology ofBuddhist Tibet.' In this remarkable
work, French paints a picture of the legal culture of pre-annexation Tibet.
This culture, as David Loy notes, bears many similarities to the approach
taken in restorative justice.2 For example, a legal dispute was not concluded
until all parties agreed to the outcome and if, after the judgement, a party
found that the dispute continued to linger, they could re-open the previous
case.' All disputes were evaluated in terms of their root or background
cause, and an essential part of many legal remedies was to reintegrate the
parties into their community.' While it is interesting that Tibet, like many
other cultures, had something like a restorative system ofjustice, the mere
existence of that system is not especially helpful in understanding how
to develop a restorative justice system in the west. Buddhist philosophy,
however, has a sophisticated and, I think, accurate account of the self
and its relationship with others. I argue that this account can enrich the
description of relationality of self articulated by some proponents of
restorative justice and that Buddhist practices can serve as useful tools to
bring an experience of that self into one's daily life.
I. The importance of an articulated account ofselfhood
Before launching into the argument, it is important to step back and
examine why this is an important question in the first place. Why should
restorative justice practitioners, or anyone for that matter, care about the
metaphysics of the self? The reason is that almost every ethical claim we
make is based on a particular view of what human beings are, and what
1. Rebecca Redwood French, The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet (Ithaca,
NY. Cornell University Press, 1995).
2. David R Loy, "Healing Justice: A Buddhist Perspective" in Michael L Hadley, ed, The Spiritual
Roots of Restorative Justice (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001) 81.
3. French, supra note I at 138-139.
4. Ibid at 143.
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they ought to do in order to flourish. Even seemingly neutral theories
like natural science or economics rely on unstated claims about what we
are and what we should be. Underlying every claim about whether an
institution is good or bad is a set of assumptions about what kind of being
that institution is good or bad for. It is, therefore, important to articulate
and examine what we mean by selfhood when making any sort of ethical
or political argument.
The ethical justifications of the criminal justice system are based
on a particular conception of self. Consider the Canadian prohibition
against the death penalty. In United States v Burns the Supreme Court of
Canada ruled that extraditing someone to a country in which they may be
executed is unconstitutional.' Implicit in this decision is that it is morally
inexcusable to destroy a particular kind of self: the self that is represented
by one's physical body. In the same way our prohibitions against torture
or cruel and unusual punishment give a special kind of protection to the
body.' The government is generally not allowed to interfere with one's
physical integrity because that integrity corresponds, more or less, to our
intuitive notion of selfhood. The criminal sanction is, however, allowed
to destroy all kinds of other things, which, under different understandings
of selfhood, are just as important as physical autonomy. It is allowed,
for instance, to destroy the social, emotional, and psychological self by
excising a person from their community and holding them in prolonged
solitary confinement.' Underlying these latter decisions is the idea that the
morally relevant self is bounded by one's body and does not include one's
relationships to others.
Another example of the concept of self within criminal justice is the
ethical basis for incarceration. Incarceration relies on at least two claims
about the self. First, there is a presumption that the self stays the same over
the course of an individual's life. An individual, at the age of forty-two,
may still be serving time for a crime that was committed when they were
eighteen. Implicit in this practice is the belief that the self at forty-two is
the same as the self at eighteen, otherwise it would be a case of punishing
one person (the forty-two-year-old self) for the activities of another (the
eighteen-year-old self). The only way for the ethical calculus to make
sense is if self-nature adheres over time. This is especially evident in the
continued imprisonment of prisoners living with dementia. The fact that
5. United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] I SCR 283.
6. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, s 12, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
7. Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and 'Supermax' Confinement"
(2003) 49 Crime & Delinquency 124 at 130.
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we think it moral to continue punishing someone for crimes committed
by a self they no longer remember shows that we assume a self has some
kind of unchanging nature over time which is independent of conscious
memory.8
The criminal sanction also relies on the idea of a separate or at least
severable self. In order to punish an individual for a crime, we must think
that the responsibility and punishment are bounded by that individual. The
blameworthiness must be attached to that individual and the punishment
must only apply to that individual. For this to work the self needs to be
metaphysically separate from others. For instance, if a father commits a
crime and is imprisoned, we must be able to at least conceptually separate
him from his daughter in order for the blameworthiness and punishment
to apply to the same being. A notion of self which held that individuals
are not metaphysically separate would say that a part of their child is
imprisoned along with the father. Without the metaphysical separation
between the self that committed the crime, and the selves that surround it,
imprisonment becomes quite difficult to justify.
All of this is to say that in order to think about the ethics of criminal
justice, or indeed the ethical basis of anything, we must understand the
claims about selfhood which underlie those ethical claims.
II. .The relational self in restorative justice
In addition to a new approach to the administration of justice, restorative
justice presents a different understanding of self. For the purposes of this
paper I am going to work primarily with the definition of restorative justice,
offered by Jennifer Llewellyn, as "a wider lens, carved and illuminated by
a relational conception of the self and its implications for how we are in
the world."' This view understands restorative justice not as a mechanism
of a liberal individualist criminal system, but as a whole new theory of
justice based on relational theory. I focus almost exclusively on this theory
throughout this paper because it explicitly attends to the metaphysics of
selfhood within the restorative justice context.
What does a relational theory of justice think about the self? Jocelyn
Downie and Jennifer Llewellyn put it this way:
The relational conception of the self with which we are concerned
recognizes not only that we live in relationships with others but also
8. Pam Belluk, "Life, With Dementia," The New York Times (25 February 2012), online: New York
Times <http://www.nytimes.com>.
9. Jennifer J Llewellyn, "Thinking Relationally about Justice" in Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J
Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2011) 89 at 90.
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that relationship and connection with others is essential to the existence
of the self. The human self in this view is constituted in and through
relationship with others. 0
This account is composed of two claims: first, that human beings are
constituted by their relationships, and second, that they have autonomy.
The first claim is that what it is to be a human being is to be in
relationships with other beings. An individualist" might understand
the importance of relationships by saying that they are necessary to
promote particular individual rights, but they must maintain that there is
something outside of those relationships that constitutes the self. While
an individualist would understand language or networks of care as the
activities of the self, a relational theorist would say that those things
are a part of the self.12 Once these characteristics are included in one's
conception of the self it becomes impossible to draw a bright line between
one particular self and the relationships in which it stands. For instance, if
we think that language is a part of the self, and that language is impossible
without a community of speakers, then we cannot conceptually separate
the self from that community." Under a relational account, the self is
constituted in and through relationships with others and we are in a sense
"second persons.. .who come after and before other persons." 4 This is not
to say that the self is nothing more than the community, but that there is no
way of drawing a bright line between self and other.
The second claim is that human beings are autonomous. While
highlighting the interconnected character of the self, relational theorists
also attempt to preserve individual existence by saying that "[a] relational
conception of self seeks to recognize the inherently relational nature of the
self without denying the significance of the individual and the agency of
the self."" Relational theorists seem to claim on the one hand that we are
wholly relational, but also that we have some kind of individual existence.
At first glance this is a confusing metaphysical claim. For most
people, the definition of individuality is the quality which stands outside
10. Jennifer J Llewellyn & Jocelyn Downie, "Introduction" in ibid at 4.
11. Individualism here is used to refer to the set of theories which hold that the individual self
is metaphysically separate from others. It does not, in this paper, refer to relational individuality-
the notion that what we think of as "individual" necessarily includes the relationships in which that
individual stands.
12. Llewellyn & Downie, supra note 10.
13. See Christine M Koggel, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Lanham,
MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1998).
14. Annette Baier, Postures of Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1985) at 84-85, in Llewellyn & Downie, supra note 10 at 5.
15. Ibid at 5.
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of relationships. It is what makes "me" not "you." The claim that human
beings are simultaneously relational and individual is either contradictory,
or relies on a different definition of individuality. Using this definition
there is no way to perform a delicate balancing act between the individual
self and the relational self-it has to either be one or the other.
One way of understanding the relational theorist's claim is that the
relational definition of individuality is something like "that which has
autonomy." Relational theory is sometimes thought of as a way past the
extremes of liberalism, which does not acknowledge the importance of
relationships, and thick communitarianism, which deprives the self of
any kind of agency. The relational theorist argues that the autonomous
qualities we ascribe to individuals actually take place within a dense
network of relationships, and so that autonomy is preserved even when the
self is wholly understood in terms of those relationships.' 6 If individuality
is understood as the quality of autonomy, then the claim that human beings
are both relational and individual is intelligible.
This account is appealing, but it is deeply counterintuitive. If the self
is fully relational 7 then when those relationships change the self must
change along with them. Since there is no self apart from relationships,
then there is also nothing to connect the current self to previous selves. The
self becomes a river which we cannot step into twice. One could respond to
this argument by saying that because some relationships remain relatively
stable and constant over time, the self adheres even when some of its
relationships change. This claim is difficult to understand without relying
on an individualist understanding of self: the individualist self is the thing
which stays constant over one's lifetime. If there is no such self, then what
exactly is it that remains the same while the various relationships change?
Obviously we have a concept of selfhood which adheres over time, just as
we have a concept of "river" which adheres even as the concrete qualities
of that river change, but if relational theory begins to equate that concept
with selthood it collapses into an individualist account."
16. For example, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that autonomous judgement is only possible when that
judgment takes place in reference to a community of other judging individuals. Jennifer Nedelsky,
"The Reciprocal Relation of Judgment and Autonomy" in Llewellyn & Downie, supra note 9 at 56.
17. By which I mean there is no quality of self outside of relationship.
18. It is possible that a relational theorist would not go this far. For instance, they could say that
so long as certain relationships, or a certain proportion of those relationships, remain the same, the
self will adhere over time. Such a theorist would, however, have difficulty articulating why the self
adheres without relying upon some kind of individuated understanding of selihood. In order to say that
a relational self has remained relevantly unchanged even as its component relationships change, we
must have a non-relational notion of that self for comparison. If not, then there is no way to articulate
just which qualities of a relational self are essential and which can change without fundamentally
altering the nature of the self.
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The relational account of self challenges our intuition that we have a
separate unchanging existence. Almost all of the ways we as human beings
understand ourselves-linguistically, legally, and morally-rely on a
separate self which adheres over time. Our intuitions about individuality are
not just that we are autonomous, but that we are metaphysically separate.
Even for those of us who take a relational view of the self, it is difficult to
reconcile the relational view with our daily practice of separateness. There
is a difficulty that arises when we consider our relationship to the world:
while we cannot explain a separate self, we cannot imagine any other kind.
The Buddhist approach to this difficulty is that the question "what is
the self' is something of a category mistake. Buddhists make a distinction
between relative and absolute truth: relative truth is the truth of appearances
and absolute truth is the truth of the underlying reality of the world. For
example, the appearance of a computer program is of virtual windows and
icons moving in a kind of space, while the reality is that a computer is an
interaction of electrons and semi-conductors. Both the appearance of the
computer program and the underlying reality have a kind of reality, but
they do not have the same kind of reality, one is an appearance and one is
the underlying existence.' 9 To answer the question "what is the self' it is
necessary to be clear about whether the question refers to the appearance
of the self, or to its truly existing nature.
From an absolute perspective there is no single, separate self which
continues over time. French puts it well in The Golden Yoke:
At its most essential, everything is in constant movement, changing its
composition continuously, never stable, combining and recombining
into the various accumulations that we mistake for permanent objects
and individuals. ...One consequence of this view is that no "self' exists
in any deep sense in Buddhist philosophy, no ego or actor, no constant or
permanent individuality.20
This is a radically relational view of the self. Not only do relationships
to other human beings form a constitutive part of the self, but one's
relationship to the physical world and to one's previous selves are all
irreducible parts of one's nature. A relationship between a parent or child
is a great example of how relationships constitute the self. It is not possible
to exist as a human being without some relationship to a parent. If we
had different parents, there is a sense that we would be different people.
Buddhists would say that everything that stands in a causal relationship
19. This is not a transcendental view; it is possible from Buddhist perspective to directly experience
absolute reality.
20. French, supra note 1 at 64.
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has this same effect on the self. If you slip on the ice and sustain a severe
concussion, that affects who you are every bit as much as the relationship
to another human being. These relationships constitute the whole self.
There is no soul or similar concept that ties the relationships together. This
is what is meant when Buddhists refer to "emptiness of self': there is no
object or substance which has the qualities of separateness and permanence
that we ascribe to the self.
The issue with this radically relational account of self is that it can
lead to a kind of nihilism. If the self is composed entirely of causal
relationships, then that might imply that all of its potential actions are pre-
determined. The view that emptiness of self leads to complete helplessness
or determinism is a misunderstanding that some Buddhist traditions21 call
the "poison of emptiness."22 Those traditions hold that absence of a solid
self does not imply a lack of autonomy or vibrancy to human experience.
Rather, in addition to their relational character, all beings have an innate
quality of compassion and wisdom. This quality is referred to by different
names depending upon the particular tradition. In Hinayana Buddhism it is
called "Buddha Nature,"2 3 in Mahayana traditions it is called "bodhichitta"
or "awakened heart"; and in the Shambhala Buddhist tradition is it
called "Basic Goodness."24 Underlying all of these terms is the idea that
human beings are fundamentally worthy and kind, and that they have the
capacity to affect the future. The process of spiritual accomplishment or
enlightenment is not so much acquiring something outside of oneself as it
is uncovering the inherent worthiness which is already there.
From an absolute perspective the Buddhist view is the same as the
relational view of self. The self has the quality of irreducible connectedness
or interdependence, as well as the quality of autonomy or Basic Goodness.
The theoretical contribution that Buddhism offers is an explanation of
how people can behave as though they are separate even though they
understand conceptually that they are relational. On a Buddhist account,
while we may be interdependent from an absolute perspective, our relative
experience of self is separate.
From a relative perspective, we see the world as though we had a
stable, independent, and permanent self. Experientially, there is definitely
a difference between oneself and others. We draw bright lines between
21. This view is articulated by the Madyamaka Shentong school of Mahayana Buddhism.
22. Ch6gyam Trungpa, Training the Mind and Cultivating Loving Kindness (Boston: Shambhala
Publications, 1993) at 29 [Trungpa, Training the Mindj.
23. In Sanskrit: "Tathatagharba."
24. Chdgyam Trungpa, Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior (Boston: Shambhala
Publications, 1984) at 30.
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ourselves and other beings, between beings and objects, and between
things we care about, and things we do not care about. Maintaining our
own existence is our constant occupation and has been for most of our
lives. We spend all day and night evaluating our position, planning how
to improve it, and regretting our missed opportunities. The apparent
existence of a separate, permanent self pervades human experience. Upon
examination, however, it might be clear that this is not a tenable account
of the self. We know that we were born and will die, and so we could ask
when the self started and when it will end. Did it start at birth before we
had a consciousness or memory? Does it end when our heart stops or at
brain death? How can there be a permanent, continuous, and distinct self
when it has such vague boundaries? The nonsensical quality of this notion
of a continuous separate self arises, according to the Buddhist teachings,
because it is an illusion, and illusions do not have to make sense.
The problem according to Buddhist philosophy is not that we have
an illusory self, but that we mistake this illusion for reality. As Khenpo
Tsutrim Gyamsto writes:
The question is not whether or not the person, personality or ego is a
changing, composite train of events conditioned by many complex
factors, the question is why then do we behave emotionally as if it were
lasting, single and independent.25
The main difficulty is not that we have a relative experience of our own
separateness, but that we believe that illusion to be reality. Even if we
understand that the bright lines we draw between ourselves and others are
arbitrary, it is important to acknowledge that most people do not perceive
the world that way. Addressing this gap between our basic relationality
and our experience of separateness is the primary aim of the Buddhist
teachings.
Buddhist epistemology differs slightly from that of the west. In the
west we often regard necessary conceptual truth as the most reliable. The
general form of knowing in western philosophy is to sta'rt at the most
objective end of the spectrum of truth, and then move towards contingent
forms of knowledge in areas where necessary truth is unavailable. For
instance, we might try to understand the world mathematically, but then
look to empirical science or social science in places where mathematical
certainty is unavailable.
25. Tsultrim Gyamsto, Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness (Auckland: Zhyisil Chokyi
Ghatsal Publications, 2001) at 11.
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Buddhists regard realization, or direct experience of reality, as the
highest form of knowledge. While it is important to have a complete
philosophical description of the self, that description is only valuable
insofar as it leads to direct experience of that description. The traditional
way in which this epistemology is expressed is in terms of the three types
of knowing: listening, reflecting, and meditating.26 Listening refers to
investigating an area with an open and receptive mind. This could involve
listening to a lecture, reading a book, or perhaps gathering data. Reflecting
or contemplating involves thinking about and testing whatever it was
that you listened to in order to ensure that it actually is true. This might
involve applying logical techniques to the information, connecting it to
other bits of knowledge, or testing that knowledge in the world around
you. Meditating in this context means "to integrate the newly acquired
knowledge or understanding into one's being or character,"27 or to put it
into practice. For example, learning to dance might involve an explanation
of the steps (hearing), trying out the individual steps (reflecting), and
finally actually dancing (meditating). The key point is that the final stage
of experienced knowledge is the most important.
III. The gap between theory and practice in restorative justice
Compulsory Compassion by Annalise Acorn is perhaps not a great
theoretical work of restorative justice,28 but it does provide an example
of the difficulty of bringing the principles of restorative justice into one's
own experience. Acorn, a one-time proponent of restorative justice,
found that there was a disconnect between her intellectual commitment
to a restorative approach and her ability to bring that approach into her
own life. "There was something troubling," Acorn writes, "about my own
hesitancy and about my lack of confidence in my own willingness and
ability to apply the theory to myself."29 There is a big difference for Acorn
between accepting her account of restorative justice and directly feeling
the validity of that account in her life.
This difference is important for Acorn because she thinks that
restorative justice requires a genuine feeling of connection and forgiveness.
When discussing the teachableness of universal love, she writes that
restorative justice is both "too spiritual and not spiritual enough" because it
26. Chagyam Trungpa, The Profound Treasury of the Ocean of Dharma Vol 1, (Boston: Shambhala
Publications, 2013) at 491.
27. Ibid.
28. Annalise Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2004) at 7; Bruce Archibald, "Why Restorative Justice is Not
Compulsory Compassion: Annalise Acorn's Labour of Love Lost" (2004) 42 Alta L Rev 941.
29. Acorn, ibid at 7.
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requires that people operate at a level beyond their own individual desires
for retribution without some kind of great scorekeeper in the sky who
rewards selfless action. Restorative justice, for Acorn, asks participants to
accomplish supererogatory feats of virtue. Her notion is that the average
person is essentially interested in punishing people who harm them, so
putting them in a restorative situation that depends on people reaching
beyond themselves is asking too much."0
Acorn's strongly stated worry is that forced compassion is false
compassion. She writes that fabricated love does not count as love at all
and that "love of the burglar who breaks into your house, the stranger
assailant who rapes you.. .has to be of this deliberately and painstakingly
fabricated kind."" If restorative justice requires universal love, then the
fact that this love is not genuinely felt is a major problem. When asked
to undertake these supererogatory feats of forgiveness, compassion, and
love, restorative justice participants revert to a thoughtless pretense of
what is asked of them.
One response to Acorn's critique is to say that she misidentifies the
requirements of restorative justice. In his review of the book, Bruce
Archibald writes that "no responsible advocate of restorative justice
requires forgiveness from the victim."32 This response, while valid,
is perhaps too narrowly focused. Acorn builds an argument around a
caricature of restorative justice," and this argument can be refuted simply
by identifying that restorative justice differs from that caricature, but the
fact remains that any restorative approach does require something different
from victims and offenders than the criminal justice system. There is some
kind of connection, or activity of relationality, that is required for the
restorative justice process to accomplish its goals. This is after all the chief
virtue of the restorative justice articulated by Llewellyn. Restorative justice
conceived as relational justice requires the activity of relationality-the
experience of oneself as including relationships to others.
Acorn's argument could be rephrased in terms of relationality rather
than compassion.34 Just as we often do not feel compassion towards other
beings, we often do not feel connected to them. A relational view of self
holds that we are constituted in and through our relationships to others.
This includes relationships to families and communities as well as to those
who have wronged us. Asking a victim to consider the ways in which their
30. Ibid at 38.
31. Ibid at 40.
32. Archibald, supra note 28 at 944.
33. In particular, Acorn is not specific as to which kinds of restorative justice she is criticizing.
34. It could be argued that compassion is really just a kind of experience of relationship.
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being is constituted in and through their relationship to their assailant is
at least as radical and difficult as asking them to forgive. Without some
articulation of the gap between theory and experience, and without some
mechanism of closing that gap, even a relational justice faces the same kind
of reaction that is expressed in Compulsory Compassion. If restorative
justice asks participants to participate in something that they cannot locate
in their experience, there is a risk that they will reject the project outright
or engage in a dumb pretense.
The main value of Compulsory Compassion is that it expresses
what can happen when there is a gap between the theory of restorative
justice and one's experience of daily life. At its root, Acorn's rejection of
restorative justice is not really the result of clean, dispassionate analysis,
but simply because she honestly could not see the principles of restorative
justice reflected in her existence. Acorn uses a number of literary
examples to disprove the assumptions of restorative justice practices, but
the only real argument is an assertion that these examples "ring truer"
than the principle of restorative justice." This is what makes the book
both compelling and flawed: it is not really so much an argument as it is a
statement of experience. Experience is, however, tremendously important.
If restorative justice theory cannot be brought into experience, then it is
very fragile.
In terms of Buddhist epistemology, Acorn's story expresses a problem
with the third stage of knowing-putting the theory into practice. Acorn
heard about restorative justice theory and she was able to reflect on that
information, but she was not able to actually blend that knowledge into
her experience, and so it ended up ringing false. Without that kind of
knowing, from a Buddhist perspective, one's principles are nothing more
than fragile fabrications.36
The Buddhist view of this problem is that while we might be
fundamentally compassionate, wise, and relational, we are deeply
conditioned by habit. Even if our absolute nature is relationality, our
whole lives have been lived in the apparent world of separateness, and so
we have an extremely strong habit of thinking of ourselves as separate and
permanent. It is naive to think that after a lifetime of training in separateness
someone will suddenly fully understand themselves as irreducibly related
to others. Almost every aspect of our society trains people to relate to
35. Acorn, supra note 28 at 24.
36. It might be that Acorn's view of restorative justice is flawed, but this amounts to the same issue.
Either she did not bring the theory into experience, or it was not a theory that could be brought into
experience. Either way, the problem was that it was not expressed in her life.
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issues through the lens of our separateness. We discipline children for
discrete acts of wrongdoing, our stories are told in terms of legal fault and
causation, and most of our institutions are built around our metaphysical
separateness. Throughout most of our lives we work on our separate selves
and so it is profoundly unsurprising that it is difficult to experience the
world any other way.
IV. The contribution of meditation practice
All Buddhist practices are meant to bring the teachings of the Buddha
into one's experience. The main point of the tradition is to help people
understand the nature of their experience, develop compassion, and
ease suffering." Therefore, all Buddhist practices are aimed at helping
to develop an experience of what the philosophy describes. The previous
sections have argued that restorative justice and Buddhist philosophy share
a similar account of the self, and that a gap exists between the relational
theory behind restorative justice and the experience of some practitioners.
This section suggests that shamatha meditation could be a useful tool to
help restorative justice practitioners to develop an intuitive understanding
of relationality.
Shamatha means "peaceful abiding" in Sanskrit." Shama means
"peace," and tha means "to abide" or "to develop." So, in a sense, this
practice is a way to cultivate peace by abiding in it. The meditator takes
a good posture, places their attention on the breath, and when the mind
wanders, gently and without recrimination, returns it to their breathing.
This practice is substantially the same across many Buddhist and non-
Buddhist traditions, and the world of empirical science is perhaps most
familiar with it as the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction mental health
intervention. 9
One Tibetan word for meditation is gom, which means "to become
familiar with." In this sense we are always meditating on something. If we
spend a lot of time becoming familiar with anger or jealously, anger and
jealousy become easier and more automatic. Similarly if we spend a lot
of time thinking about ourselves, then that becomes easier to do. Mental
activity is exactly the same as any other activity: the more you do a thing
the easier that thing becomes. Shamatha meditation is simply becoming
familiar with the mind. The technique of posture, following the breathing,
and bringing the attention back to the breath is only there to bring your
37. Trungpa, Training the Mind, supra note 22 at 128.
38. Mipham J Mukpo, Turning the Mind into an Ally (New York: Riverhead Books, 2003) at 5.
39. For more information on MBSR see online: University of Massachusetts Medical School <http://
www.umassmed.edu/cfin/stress/index.aspx>.
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attention clearly to what the mind is doing. When you observe your mind
without judgement, you begin to see how thoughts and emotions arise out
of the blue and completely captivate one's attention. These thoughts and
emotions are the origin of the relative experience of self that I discussed
earlier: the mind moves so quickly between distinct thoughts and emotions
it appears to be a solid, separate thing. Formal meditation allows us to
relax and slow down so that we can actually see what the mind is doing.40
Through meditation we can "see how the mind creates our solid
sense of self and begin to discover the mind's natural state of being."41
In terms of interdependence, this illustrates how looking clearly at the
mind can begin to reveal the relative experience of separateness as an
illusion. Through practice, the strong intuition of separateness is revealed
to be built on nothing but ephemeral thoughts and emotions. As a result
of seeing through some portion of the illusion of separateness, meditators
experience glimpses of their basic nature, which is a direct feeling of one's
irreducible relationship to others and one's basic worthiness as a human
being.
The fact that our minds are constantly present in our life means that
developing a familiarity with the mind leads to all kinds of beneficial
effects. Meditation helps with physical and emotional pain management,
immune response in cancer patients, and feelings of connectedness in
romantic relationships. It is also helpful for depression, self-regulation of
emotional response, and aggressive tendencies in teenagers. Each week
there are new empirical findings that structured meditation practice leads
to improvements in a variety of physical and mental health indications.42
The practical skills that are developed through shamatha meditation
are directly applicable to the restorative justice process. For instance, it
has been argued that the restoration of the victim's emotional wellbeing is
a major benefit of the restorative approach43 and meditation is a promising
intervention for treating emotional pain." Meditation has also been used
successfully to reduce hostility and mood disturbance and improve self-
40. Mukpo, supra note 38 at 34.
41. Ibidat 34.
42. For a detailed summary of clinical research related to mindfulness see Greg Flaxman & Lisa
Flook, "Brief Summary of Mindfulness Research," online: Mindfulness and Awareness Research
Center <http://marc.ucla.edu>.
43. Heather Strang, "Justice for victims of young offenders: The centrality of emotional harm and
restoration" in Gerry Johnstone, ed, A Restorative Justice Reader (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003)
286.
44. Vujanovic et al, "Mindfulness-based acceptance and posttraumatic stress symptoms among
trauma-exposed adults without axis I psychopathology" (2009) 23 J Anxiety Disorder 297, online:
NCBI <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov>.
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esteem in prison populations,45 which is directly in line with the restorative
goal of rehabilitating offenders rather than punishing them.46 Finally,
mindfulness has been found to be positively associated with expressing
oneself to others and empathetic engagement.4 7 These qualities of empathy
and communication between victims, offenders, and their communities
are important aspects of the restorative process.48
It is possible to understand shamatha using the language of restorative
justice. Restorative justice is classically concerned with restoring right
relations between individuals. Howard Zehr famously used the Hebrew
word shalom to articulate the state of harmony that our justice system
should be aiming to restore.49 Shalom is translated as "peace" or "all
rightness," which is roughly the same meaning as the shama part of
shamatha. Zehr uses this notion to argue that in cases of crime or social
disruption, there is already some kind of pre-existing social fracture and
the crime is just a symptom of that more basic disharmony. Restorative
processes can relate to crime more fully than the criminal justice system
because they can address this more basic disharmony.
From a Buddhist perspective, the original fractured relationship is
the one that we have with ourselves. For whatever reason, human beings
tend not to be able to rest in their interdependence, but instead attempt to
manufacture a permanent, independent self. This striving to be otherwise
means that we cannot develop a positive relationship with ourselves.
Because we want to be permanent and independent, there is a constant
feeling of disappointment and anxiety when we encounter the reality of
impermanence and interdependence. Social problems, on this account,
arise from this personal dysfunction, and achieving social peace relies on
realizing some degree of personal peace.
The insight that social dysfunction and personal dysfunction are
related is not new. James Gilligan's Violence: Reflections on a National
Epidemic, as just one example, is a stirring account of twenty-five years of
encounters with some of the more extreme inmates in the Massachusetts
45. Marlene Samuelson et al, "Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction in Massachusetts Correctional
Facilities" (2007) 87 The Prison Journal 254, online: Sage Journals <http://tpj.sagepub.com/
content/87/2/254>.
46. Llewellyn, supra note 9.
47. Dekeyser et al, "Mindfulness skills and interpersonal behaviour" (2008) 44 Personality and
Individual Differences 1235, online: Science Direct <http://www.sciencedirect.com>.
48. Barry Stuart, "Guiding Principles for Peacemaking Circles" in Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff,
eds, Restorative Community Justice: Repairing Harm and Transforming Communities (Cincinnati,
OH: Anderson Publishing Co, 2001) at 282.
49. Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Scotsdale: Herald Press,
1990) at 130.
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prison system."o Gilligan's main point is that the extreme acts of violence
these men committed were rooted in some form of deep personal shame
and trauma. This is a tangible example of the interrelationship between
social and individual trauma. Because these men were brutalized by their
particular society, they developed some kind of psychological dysfunction,
which in turn led them to brutalize the world in its turn. But of course we
could say the same thing about the people who harmed them in the first
place, and so the cycle of blame spirals beyond our comprehension. From
both a relational and Buddhist perspective, there is no bright line between
self and society, so there is no ultimate difference between social trauma
and personal trauma. The harms individuals endure are social harms
because the relationships between individuals constitute society.
It follows, then, that social and personal harmony depend upon one
another. Meditation practice is the Buddhist approach to developing
personal harmony. By simply sitting and paying attention to the breath,
practitioners discover that their minds and hearts are fundamentally
healthy and whole. This discovery allows people to relax their habits of
self-hatred and emotional poverty and develop a more friendly relationship
towards themselves. This friendliness and familiarity in turn allows them
to turn outward and encounter the world with kindness. This could be
categorized as a kind of restorative process, but what is being restored is
the relationship with oneself.
Correspondingly we could understand the restorative circle as the
social analog of individual meditation practice. Meditation is simply a
structure and technique that causes people to notice the movement of their
minds and allows their natural wisdom and compassion to come to the
surface. The idea is that human beings have the capacity to solve their own
problems, and so do not need an external force to process their neuroses
and develop kindness. The meditation technique itself merely brings
attention to the capacity that is already there.
Restorative practices play the same role at the level of community.
Central to the restorative project is that communities have the capacity
to understand and solve their own problems. Rather than needing a
professional legal institution to dispassionately adjudicate a conflict, the
community actually possesses the kindness and intelligence to see what
needs to be done. Restorative processes serve as techniques for bringing
this kindness and intelligence to the surface. Sitting in a circle, hearing the
stories of the other parties and, having a facilitator guide the discussion,
all bring the participant's mind back to their social connectedness, and
50. James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).
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to the worthiness of that community. Like individual meditation practice,
the technique of restorative justice can bring attention to the communal
capacity which is already there.
A common story of restorative encounters is that they create a kind of
magical environment in which both offenders and victims do remarkable
and unexpected things. Lifetime criminals suddenly come to terms with
their past misdeeds and make genuine, permanent changes in their lives.
Victims forgive their wrongdoers and find healing in doing so." The
Buddhist explanation of this magic is that human beings are basically
good. They have an innate capacity for compassion and wisdom, and when
they are given environments and practices which allow that goodness to
surface, they are capable of remarkable things. Many restorative processes
are these kinds of environments. They provide a space for people to feel
their connection to their world, and their own worthiness as human beings.
The experience of that space is what is called "magic."
This has two important implications for restorative justice
practitioners. First, it provides further support for the idea that restorative
processes should be used outside of situations of conflict. If the restorative
process is indeed a technique which brings attention to relationality, then
it is important to practice that technique outside of stressful situations.
Most people first encounter a restorative practice in a time of conflict or
personal trauma. This is like learning to meditate while having a nervous
breakdown. Stressful periods are bad for learning anything new, let alone
something that fundamentally challenges one's sense of self. If restorative
justice is understood as practice rather than a response, it is sensible to hold
restorative processes regularly and in cases where there is no immediate
conflict. The use of restorative processes in schools is just one example of
how this change in approach has already taken root.52
Secondly, it suggests that individual meditation practice would be
helpful for restorative justice practitioners and participants. The limitation
of the restorative circle as the primary way of working with one's mind is
that it is a difficult practice. Logistically, of course, people do not participate
in very many restorative circles because circles usually occur in response
to a particular event, and always involve other people's schedules. More
basically, however, working with others is more complicated and difficult
than working with oneself alone. It is always possible when relating with
51. Jo Nodding, "The Meeting: Jo's Story-Surviving Rape," online: Restorative Justice Council
<http://www.restorativejustice.org/RJOB/josstory>.
52. Mary Shafer & Laura Mirsky, "The Restorative Approach in Nova Scotia: A Partnership of
Government, Communities and Schools" (2011), online: Restorative Practices E Forum <www.iirp.
edu>.
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others to blame them for all of the problems that arise in a process. In
individual meditation practice there is less possibility of assigning credit or
blame to some external thing because the practice does not really involve
external things. Since the practice is just sitting and following the breath,
it is clear that everything which comes up during that practice is one's own
mind. There simply is not anything else going on. This provides a great
deal of clarity as to your own mental life.
This is not to say that meditation or restorative processes are better
or worse than each other at developing a felt-sense of relationality, just
that they do so at different levels. Individual meditation practice is all
about developing familiarity and friendliness towards oneself, and seeing
how our strong intuitions of separateness are in fact complete illusions.
Restorative justice takes that same kind of process and turn it outwards
towards the social world. By understanding and working with both the
social and individual practices, restorative justice practitioners can more
effectively bring abstract notions of relationality into their daily experience.
